conditions. This report also mentions that the Army has not realized the full potential it had envisioned for the National Training Center, falling short of the goal of objectively assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of its organizations and weapon systems. Two major causes are cited for this perceived shortfall: * Objective data collected through the Center's instrumentation system is too unreliable and incomplete for overall analysis.
Army doctrine stresses four basic battlefield tenets: Initiative, Agility,
Depth and Synchronization, all of which contribute heavily to success on the modem battlefield. Objective indications of how well a particular brigade/ battalion force performed according to these tenets, for a given battle, would form a useful training tool. Such indications would also help answer the shortfalls addressed by the General Accounting Office report.
TRAC Monterey has contracted with the Naval Postgraduate School to investigate useful, graphic presentations of the synchronization and agility of battalion/brigade size forces at the National Training Center. This report discusses the current state of this research and illustrates a number of graphic presentations of synchronization which should prove useful in After Action
Reviews of performance at the National Training Center. These displays may also prove appropriate for the unit take-home packages for review, as well as reference for future training.
Project description
A major goal of the Battle Enhanced Analysis Methodology (BEAM) project is the development of computer displays which meaningfully picture synchronization and agility in a tactical level battle. This in turn requires the identification of measurable quantities which portray these two attributes.
Both of these terms are rather broad and general, subject to a number of interpretations, possibly dependent on the context in which they are used. To gain insight into the way in which the Army employs these words in the defining tenets, many field manuals and other documents have been reviewed; several of these are discussed briefly below and are listed in the
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references. This review of written material has been supplemented with expert Army (and other service) opinion, also discussed in the following section.
As a result of the documentation review and assessment of expert opinion, it was decided to concentrate initial efforts on picturing aspects of synchronization. This remains a broad term which can be applied in several ways, one of the most basic of which is the synchronization of weapon firing.
Displays of direct fire synchronization have been developed and are illustrated. These displays may also prove easily adaptable to displays of indirect fire, which will be addressed in the latter part of this project.
Another aspect of synchronization refers to movement of forces; displays for this type of synchronization have also been developed and will be discussed. 
Implications of review and opinions
Computer displays which meaningfully picture synchronization to combat personnel should be easy to understand and be obviously linked to one or more of the common ways in which the term is used. Synchronization is a broad term; it clearly encompasses coordination and integration of separate parts, both before and during the battle. Indeed it is also meant to be a result, as stated in FM 100-5, with the goal of maximizing relative combat power at the decisive point. In FM 100-5, "combat power" is defined to have four components: Maneuver, Firepower, Protection and Leadership. Of these, FM 100-5 identifies Leadership as being the most essential. Unfortunately, as also pointed out in this manual, there are no ready formulas for measuring this essential element, so it has not been considered as a possible candidate for 8 displays. The two components of Protection (making soldiers, systems, units difficult to locate and destroy, in addition to health and morale issues) are also not easy to quantify for display and have not been actively considered for visual portrayal.
The remaining two components of combat power, Maneuver and Firepower, can be quantified in a number of ways and have been studied as candidates for useful computer displays of synchronization of a tactical force.
The following sections provide discussions of possible ways to display these two components of combat power.
Displays of Synchronization
As indicated in the above discussion, synchronization of battle forces is If one has placed individual direct fire weapons at given locations, it is straightforward to determine the points on the battlefield which can be seen by each of them. Indeed, one can go further and build an LOS surface whose height at any point on the ground is given by the number of direct fire weapons which are able to see that point; the higher the surface at a given point, the greater is the massing of lines of sight at that point. This surface can then be colored according to its height and displayed in "wo dimensions over the contour map of the area. The changes in color over a given region reflect the changes in the massing of the lines of sight, for the given locations of the weapons used. can determine those points a in any given area A for which line of sight exists between x and a. These points a. within the range of the weapon then would be potential targets for the weapon located at x. Suppose the weapon (at x) has probability pr,w,t of hitting and killing a target of type t located at point a., and that the weapon is capable of firing Rw rounds per minute; the subscript r is meant to indicate the range between x and a., recognizing the dependence of the probability on this factor, while w is used to indicate the type of weapon at point x and t indicates the type of target at point a.. Clearly, if a target were positioned at point a., the weapon either would or would not kill this target.
To develop a comparative measure it is useful to pretend that an endless series of targets is available at point a.; when (and if) a given target is destroyed at this point it is instantly replaced by another. If there were such an endless series of targets of the given type located at a, and the weapon were to commence firing at its maximum rate, the expected number of kills this Figure 3 shows the ultimate result of the DP surface for the historical battle (the defense did not succeed).
Lamont replayed this battle in Janus(A), using initial defensive positions which followed published doctrine more closely than did those used by the unit undergoing training. His initial DP surface (at the start of the battle) is visually indistinguishable from Figure 2 , the historical placement. The resulting DP surface 120 minutes into the battle is given in Figure 4 ; note that it contains considerably darker areas, indicating higher resulting DP scores for This expected value-measure of destructive potential takes into account line of sight, firing weapon type and rate of fire, and the type of target. Other definitions of destructive potential could be used, two of which will now be described; these alternatives have not currently been implemented for comparison with D1,1.
At any point in time there could be at most one target of a given type at a given point. A different measure of DP is given by simply evaluating the probability that a single target at the given point would be killed by the 16 defending force, rather than evaluating the expected number of kills. Again, letting pr,wt represent the probability of hitting and killing a target of the given type, at range r from weapon w, if all defending weapons were to independently fire one round at the (same) target at point a, the probability the target survives (is not killed) then is I 7 w(1-pr,w,t), the product of the probabilities of each weapon not killing the target. The probability the target is killed then is I minus this quantity D23t = 1-17w(l-pr,wt), which is an alternative measure of the destructive potential of an array of Blue forces against this type of target at this point. This function D23t could also be used to define a surface over all the points a in a region A. While the expected value each of the weapons with line of sight to point a were to fire at maximum rate at a target at this point, the probability the target survives is then all points a where this ratio exceeds 1. This ratio could then also be plotted and color coded to indicate relative combat power of the two forces. One could use blue for those points a at which this ratio exceeds 1 and red for those points where it is less than 1 to simply indicate this relative combat power.
Rather than contrasting the combat powers of the two forces over the same region A, it may be more meaningful to examine Blue's combat power surface over the area AR occupied by Red's combat systems, and to examine
Red's combat power surface over the area AB occupied by Blue's combat systems. This enables evaluation of the threat posed by each side against its opposition.
Maneuver displays
Both the LOS and DP displays discussed above and currently available computer generated tactical displays can be enhanced by the optional superposition of one or more displays illustrating maneuver of the friendly or enemy forces. Several maneuver displays are currently under development. Key features of the forces that should be shown include the type and size of the unit, the centroid, the spatial arrangement, and the rate and direction of movement (the track). Warfighters currently use standard military unit symbols and hand-drawn circles, ellipses, and arrows to add these to the computer generated displays at the NTC. Many of the computergenerated displays at the NTC include a symbol for every weapon system, leading to a rather cluttered display for battalion sized groups.
Nelson (1111 considers meaningful ways of using graphic symbols to represent company, or larger, groups as a whole, requiring considerably fewer symbols on a computer display. He specifically addresses the above features (type and size, centroid, spatial arrangement, direction and rate of travel) in replacing individual symbols by unit symbols. He suggests using standard military symbols for identifying units, with the center of the symbol at the unit's centroid position (at a given time point) location of the centroid can be defined in several different ways; Nelson discusses the merits of the (xmean, y-mean) pair, trimmed mean pairs, and the (x-median, y-median) pair for this purpose.
Similarly, the dispersion of a unit at a given time can be pictured in many different ways. To give the most realistic representation of unit dispersion at a given time, he considers a number of different convex shapes, centered at the centroid, which contain a given fraction of the members of the unit. The ellipse is considered a useful shape to employ, as is the "convex hull". This latter shape has the advantage of giving more detailed information than does the smoother looking ellipse. Overlaying a terrain map with Nelson's unit symbology (for both sides)
gives an uncluttered view of the dynamics of a battle. Animation (at some time increment) with the ability to pause at selected times will provide a powerful tool for critiquing performances encountered in unit training. 
User Interface
The current candidate BEAM User Interface is pictured in Figure 6 . This has been discussed with personnel at both the TCDC and the NTTC for possible modification (as well as others). As pictured here, the user would select one of the current tenets, the scenario type, the Battlefield Operating System (BOS) of interest, as well as which aspect of the tenet-BOS combination is of interest. additional options describing the time increments available for the animation, and the additional overlays which might be of interest.
Conclusions
The BEAM project has produced a number of displays that are useful in portraying synchronization of forces, especially for defensive scenarios. It is expected that slight modifications of the LOS and DP displays will also provide good descriptors for attack scenarios. A time trace of the maximum value of a DP display, together with the enemy's maneuver display (small multiples), will give one way of portraying the agility of a tactical force. This symbology developed to describe the movement and maneuver of an armored company over time is equally applicable in displaying the maneuver of larger sized groups as well.
